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ABSTRACT 
International Policy Diffusion and Religious Freedom, 1990-2008 
 
by 
 
Allison R. Hale, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Greg Goelzhauser 
Department: Political Science 
 
 
Why do governments restrict religious freedom? As more and more governments 
have adopted restrictive policies over the past thirty years, scholars have traditionally 
examined domestic factors that may influence government choices. I build on this literature 
by extending the discussion to external factors, proposing that mechanisms of international 
policy diffusion contribute to the adoption of restrictive government religion policy. Further 
developing the policy diffusion literature with an examination of restrictive policies, I 
advance the argument that several specific mechanisms—such as geography, learning, 
imitation, or social construction—are more closely interrelated than many previous studies 
assume.   
To test these theoretical assumptions, I compile a dataset that captures years of policy 
adoption for twenty types of restrictive government religion policy based on the information 
available from the Religion and State (RAS) Project for 175 countries between 1990 and 
2008. Applying logistic regression models to conduct basic event history analysis, I find 
iv 
moderate support for the assumption that all four of the policy mechanisms examined 
increase the odds of restrictive policy adoption.  
(74 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
International Policy Diffusion and Religious Freedom, 1990-2008 
Allison R. Hale 
 
Why do governments restrict religious freedom? As more and more governments 
have adopted restrictive policies over the past thirty years, scholars have traditionally 
examined internal domestic factors—such as the role of democratic governance, economic 
growth, or internal competition—that may influence government choices. I build on this 
literature by extending the discussion to external factors, arguing that some policies may also 
spread from one government to another. This process, identified by scholars as the idea of 
policy diffusion, may occur in several ways.  
While previous research has focused on the spread of policies that are generally 
considered positive (i.e. the spread of democracy), I extend the literature by specifically 
focusing on the spread of restrictive policies. I argue that these policies may spread across 
countries through several specific mechanisms: geographic neighbors may observe each 
other, policymakers may learn generally from the adoption of policies throughout the world, 
countries may imitate the examples of others they consider powerful, or the merits of a policy 
may be socially constructed within groups of countries that have similar cultures.   
To examine these theoretical assumptions, I first compile a dataset that captures years 
of policy adoption for twenty types of restrictive government religion policy based on the 
information available from the Religion and State (RAS) Project for 175 countries between 
1990 and 2008. I then test the data with several statistical models that allow me to compare 
the extent to which the proposed mechanisms change the likelihood that a government will 
vi 
adopt a restrictive policy. Through these tests, I find moderate statistical support for the 
assumption that all four of the policy mechanisms examined increase the odds of restrictive 
policy adoption.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 2016, Pew Research Center reported that up to 74 percent of the world’s 
population lives in countries with high or very high levels of government regulation of 
religion (“Trends in Global Restrictions on Religion”). For example, Christian communities 
in China have seen “numerous churches bulldozed and crosses torn down” by the 
government (USCIRF 2016). Muslim women in at least twelve countries are subject to full or 
partial bans that prohibit the burka or other similar forms of religious dress (Sanghani 2016; 
USCIRF 2016b). Recent “anti-terrorism” legislation in Russia bans any form of preaching, 
praying, proselytizing, and dissemination of religious material outside of state-approved 
religious sites, and “authorize[s] fines of up to $15,000 for these activities conducted in 
private residences or distributed through mass print, broadcast, or online media” (USCIRF 
2016c). Throughout several countries, prisoners of conscience—“people whom governments 
hold for reasons including those related to religion”—are regularly incarcerated and in some 
cases, subject to the death penalty (USCIRF 2016). 
Moreover, between 2007 and 2013, Pew observed that the number of countries in 
which governments specifically targeted, restricted, or harassed religious groups increased 
from 118 to 133 (“Latest Trends In Religious Restrictions and Hostilities”). Additional 
academic studies further confirm that the overall level of government involvement in religion 
(GIR)—that is, government restrictions on religious practice, direct or indirect government 
support for religion, or other legislation that controls religious behavior in some way—has 
largely increased over time, and religious legislation remains “ubiquitous” even in countries 
that constitutionally separate religion and state (Fox 2006, 2011a). Additional studies seem to 
confirm that a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom seems to only translate to 
minimal protection of individual rights in practice (Fox 2015, Fox and Flores 2009; Chilton 
 2 
and Versteeg 2014). Yet even as individual governments increasingly regulate religion, 
prominent intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations continue to champion 
and uphold the right of individuals to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” 
including the right to “change his religion or belief” and to “manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship, and observance” (United Nations 1948). 
Why, then, do governments seem increasingly willing to adopt restrictive policies to 
regulate religious practice and expression? Since Berry and Berry (1990) first examined the 
adoption of a state lottery across the United States to understand whether or not public 
policies may predictably spread from one polity to another, a significant body of literature 
examining the mechanisms of policy diffusion has developed across several subfields of 
political science (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013).  
This task is particularly difficult for scholars of international policy diffusion. As 
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, 789) summarized,  
The challenge facing theorists of international policy diffusion is to demonstrate that 
domestic political and economic factors cannot alone predict when governments 
adopt new policies, and to develop and test hypotheses that distinguish among the 
several possible mechanisms of diffusion.  
In short, the assumption that nations internally develop public policy independently from one 
another is juxtaposed against an assumption of policy interdependence, under which nations 
develop public policies as informed by some sense of the international community around 
them (Franzese and Hays 2008). 
I examine these competing arguments with respect to government regulation of 
religion, assessing the likelihood that a country will adopt a regulation in a given year by 
statistically testing data newly compiled from the Religion and State (RAS) project, V-Dem 
database, Correlates of War project, and World Bank. Using these data, I evaluate policy 
adoption in several different categories of regulation—such as laws addressing religious 
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speech, observance, organizations, and proselyting—across 175 countries between 1990 and 
2008.  I find moderate statistical support for the assumption that restrictive government 
religion policies are diffusing across countries through several possible mechanisms; future 
study, however, will be necessary to further clarify which specific mechanisms can best 
predict policy adoption in this case. These results expand the current political science 
literature on religion-state relationships by looking beyond purely domestic factors that may 
influence policy adoption, and extend discussions in the diffusion literature about the best 
ways to conceptualize and measure diffusion mechanisms.  
First, I situate this study within the general literature on the relationship between 
governments and religion, specifically exploring the implications of studying explicit 
government restrictions on religious activity. Then, I build on existing diffusion literature to 
develop hypotheses about specific mechanisms that may account for the international 
diffusion of government policies restricting religion. Within this theoretical framework, I 
outline my empirical approach; in addition to operationalizing my hypotheses on diffusion 
mechanisms, I draw on literature in comparative politics and international relations to 
account for relevant domestic factors that may contribute to policy adoption. After evaluating 
my results, I conclude by briefly discussing the implications of this study for future work in 
political science. 
 
  
 4 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Studying Religion and State 
 Studying religion in society is inherently difficult. In many fields, simply defining 
what constitutes “religion,” much less attempting to understand the overlap between religion 
and society, has been the subject of intense analysis and debate (Hulsether 2005; Nongbri 
2008). Even narrowing the subject to focus just on the interaction of religion and politics is 
fraught with challenges. Recently warning scholars and policymakers of the “instability and 
even incoherence of the category of religion as [a] basis of legal protection,” Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd argues that “the adoption of religion as a legal and policy category helps to 
create the world that it purports to oversee” and in so doing oversimplifies our view of social 
relations (2015, 110-111).  As such, she suggests that scholars ought to “dethrone religion as 
a stable interpretive and policy category” in their research (114).  
In short, Hurd suggests that because governments approach “religion policy” 
differently over time or apply such policies unevenly across different religious, spiritual, or 
non-religious communities in society, that the concept of “religion policy” cannot be 
systematically studied as such by political scientists.  Acknowledging the complexity of the 
task, however, I disagree with Hurd’s logic and concur with Ani Sarkissian’s recent 
conclusion: “By ignoring religion or incorporating it into analyses of other types of identities, 
we may risk missing the essential role it plays in the politics of many societies” (2015, 6). 
Governments around the world have arguably sought to restrict, support, or control religion 
since at least the fourteenth century BCE and, as highlighted in the introduction to this paper, 
continue to do so today (Sarkissian 2015, 1-3). While government religion policies—either 
codified in law or in consistent government practice—are observable, however, many early 
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scholars failed to evaluate such policies systematically. 
Admittedly, early scholarship often focused more generally on the role or influence 
of religion in society as a cultural force, and weighed in—implicitly or explicitly—to the 
normative debate over the “appropriate” balance of religion and state. Modernization and 
secularization theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, for instance, largely 
assumed that as countries became more modernized, both the role of religion in the public 
sphere and private religiosity would decline (Almond 1960; Apter 1965; Beckford 1985; 
Deutsch 1953; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Smith 1970, 1974; Westhus 1976; Wilson 1966, 
1982).  
The secularization school was a prominent influence on the social scientific study of 
religion through the 1990s “and perhaps a bit later,” as Jonathan Fox (2015) explains. He 
outlines at least two significant effects that this emphasis had on the literature: “First, it 
arguably deterred research on the topic,” as scholars assumed religion would become 
increasingly irrelevant; “second, it forced much of the research that did exist to spend its 
efforts refuting secularization theory rather than building knowledge on the relationship 
between religion and politics” (Fox 2015: 25). As Roger Finke observes, religion-state 
relationships had been “virtually ignored in international studies. Prior to 2000, there were no 
systematic data collections on religious freedoms and few studies attempted to understand the 
origins or consequences of these freedoms” (2013).  
By the late twentieth century, however, a few new theories began to emerge to 
explain how religion could become an increasingly salient force throughout the world 
(Antoun and Hegland 1987; Casanova 1994; Kepel 1994; Sahliyeh 1990; Westerlund 1996). 
For example, Huntington’s prominent and controversial theory about a “clash of 
civilizations”—which argues that conflict and competition between several religiously 
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homogeneous civilizations will dominate international politics—has been subject to 
intensive debate as scholars have sought to better understand the potential role of religion and 
religious identities in driving international conflict in the post-Cold War world (Fox 2005; 
Huntington 1996; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi and Mindruta 2002; Russett, 
Oneal, and Cox 2000).  
Yet while many have continued to evaluate a culturally-based assumption that 
“religion engenders conflict and cooperation” (as evidenced in part by the publication of 
extensive surveys such as the Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security (Seiple, Hoover 
and Otis 2012) or the Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding (Omer, 
Appleby and Little 2015)), relatively few scholars have methodically explored or empirically 
tested concrete ways in which religion and governments interact or the ways that different 
forms of institutionalized religion-state relationships may influence (or be influenced by) 
conflict behavior or other outcomes.  
In short, a new body of literature on government religion policy has been slowly 
developing since roughly 2000 (Philpott 2009). Several important studies focus primarily on 
the potential causal impact of government policy on other outcomes. One important step 
forward in this endeavor is Grim and Finke’s The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious 
Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (2011). With a combination of large-n 
empirical analysis and a series of case studies, Grim and Finke find that when governments 
restrict religious freedom, the likelihood of violent persecution, conflict, and terrorism within 
a country increases.  
Specifically, they argue that government and social restrictions of religion are a 
mechanism “through which social, political, economic, and religious differences make a 
difference” in predicting levels of social and political stability and conflict (2011: 86). 
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Interestingly, measures of government favoritism of religion were not statistically 
significant when included; although correlated with higher restrictions of religious freedom, 
observing government favoritism of religion was less directly effective in predicting conflict 
(2011: 209-210). Citing a separate Hudson Institute study, Grim and Finke note “wherever 
the level of religious freedom is high, there tends to be fewer incidents of armed conflict, 
better health outcomes, higher levels of earned income, prolonged democracy, and better 
educational opportunities for women” (2011: 206). Reflecting on religious freedom as part of 
a “bundle of freedoms,” Grim and Finke conclude that significant research remains to 
disentangle causal relationships as religious freedom is increasingly “associated with many 
positive outcomes” (2011: 206). 
Additional literature has begun to explore the potential impact of religious cultures 
and government regulation of religion on economic outcomes. Early studies attempted to link 
economic development and the rise of capitalism to the dominance of Protestantism in a 
country, although this assertion has been questioned (Guiso et al. 2003; Iannccone 1998; 
Weber 1930 (2001); Landes 1998). In terms of the religion-state relationship, Barro and 
McCleary (2005) analyze the economic implications of whether or not a country has an 
established state religion at three specific points in the last century (1900, 1970, 2000), but 
find little relationship between established religion and per capita GDP. Gill (2013) explores 
several potential mechanisms that would link positive economic outcomes to the provision of 
religious freedom; Grim, Clark, and Snyder (2014) argue specifically that religious freedom 
contributes to good “business and economic outcomes” even after controlling for other 
political or social factors. While these types of studies are interesting, they still emphasize 
religion policy as the independent variable.  
Only a few recent studies, in fact, have considered reversing the causal direction: can 
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economic indicators actually predict the extent to which governments regulate religion? 
Theoretically, this claim is just beginning to emerge. Fox (2006), for example, found that 
high economic development might actually be correlated with an increased likelihood of 
government involvement in religion. Buckley and Mantilla (2013) similarly argue that high 
levels of economic development may enable increased regulation of religion through 
associated growth in state capacity, finding a “consistently positive” and “substantively 
significant” relationship between development and the level of government regulation 
targeting religion. 
How then, can scholars begin to disentangle the relationship between government 
religion policies and other outcomes? I suggest that to better understand the impact of 
policies providing religious freedom (relative to more restrictive government policies), 
scholars must first understand the conditions that result in high or low levels of government 
restriction of religion in the first place. If, as Grim and Finke assert, government religion 
policy moderates or amplifies existing differences in a way that can shape conflict behavior 
or promote positive economic and social outcomes, it becomes even more important to 
understand how and why governments adopt policies that restrict religion. 
 
Origins of Government Religion Policy 
Recent studies have begun to explore the domestic origins of religious restrictions or 
the deregulation of religion. Building on rational choice theory, the “religious economies” 
argument developed primarily by Finke (1990, 2013), Stark and Finke (2000), and Gill 
(2008) holds that a government’s regulation or deregulation of religion is largely a result of 
competing interests held by politicians and religious leaders. Suggesting that religious groups 
compete for resources from the state and that politicians seek to maximize the chances of 
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their political survival, Gill (2008) argues that politicians will court religious leaders to gain 
legitimacy, particularly in countries with majority religious groups, but will ultimately favor 
deregulation as their political position becomes more secure. Despite the prevalence of this 
theory throughout new literature, however, as Finke and Martin (2014) acknowledge, “little 
empirical work has directly tested these arguments.”  
In fact, while a number of studies have begun to consider the relationship between 
domestic institutions, economy, or demography and government religion policy, the literature 
has failed to arrive at consistent conclusions. Based in part on Gill’s assumptions, Grim and 
Finke (2011) extensively discuss potential religious and social motivations for restricting 
religious freedom: from the perspective of a dominant religion, to “preserve and protect the 
culture and society as a whole,” or to limit competition between religious groups for political 
or cultural power (46-50). From the perspective of states, controlling “religious activity by 
forming alliances with select religious groups or by restricting the activities of all” allows the 
state to “secure political stability and survival by controlling any potential threats from 
religion” (50). In short, they theorize that “when politicians view alliances with established 
religions as necessary for survival or they perceive religious movements as a potential threat 
to the state, religious freedoms will be denied” (51).  
Gill’s work and other studies built on the religious economies framework, however, 
have more commonly focused on forms of political competition most prominently found in 
democracies. Democracies are recognized to generally provide greater protection for human 
rights than non-democracies, and therefore may be less likely to adopt restrictions on 
religious freedom (Apodaca, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 2005; Davenport, 1995, 
1999; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Keith, 2002; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and 
Keith, 1999). At the institutional level, however, recent studies suggest that a democratic 
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political system or does not seem to necessarily imply a strong separation of religion and 
state (Driessen 2010; Fox 2007). More nuanced work suggests that certain features of 
democratic governance may matter more than others: Finke and Martin (2014) find that while 
free elections or measures of government effectiveness were insignificant in their models, the 
absence of an independent judiciary was a strong predictor of religious restrictions.  
What about non-democracies? In Varieties of Religious Repression, Ani Sarkissian 
(2015) builds on Gill’s (2008) religious economies framework and insights from Grim and 
Finke (2011) to develop a theory of religious repression in nondemocratic countries, 
acknowledging that the policies, regimes and incentives in nondemocratic states will differ 
from those in democracies. She argues that levels of religious repression in a country are a 
function of both political competition and religious divisions in society, based on preliminary 
quantitative analysis and a number of case studies. In addition to extending the religious 
economies framework beyond democracies, Sarkissian’s work notably begins to address 
another shortfall of previous work on the subject: the fact that Gill and others primarily frame 
their work with a focus on “conditions leading to deregulation of religion,” rather than 
spending much time “explaining the conditions that lead to repression of religion, which 
studies show has been increasing” (2015: 11).  
A recent, detailed analysis of different types of government religion policy across 
nearly 200 countries found that between 1990 and 2008, 55 percent of states instituted 
new/additional religion policies while only 12 percent removed them (about 16 percent did 
some combination of both and 17 percent did not significantly change) (Fox 2015).  In fact, 
while 90 percent of all countries offer some legal assurance of religious freedom, roughly 86 
percent still have laws regulating religious practice (Finke and Martin 2014). As such, I 
suggest with Sarkissian that scholars must continue to develop theoretical explanations to 
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account for these documented increases in the regulation of religion across the world. As 
described above, several authors have begun to explore potential domestic determinants of 
state religion policy. I thus expand upon existing literature on religion and state relationships 
by looking beyond internal determinants of policy, attempting to evaluate the ways in which 
restrictive religion policy may spread across countries. 
 
The Logic of Policy Diffusion 
 While domestic characteristics are likely to partially predict the adoption of 
restrictions, governments in individual countries also observe and interact with one another in 
ways that may condition their policy choices. I suggest that theories of policy diffusion may 
provide additional insight into a country’s willingness to adopt restrictive government 
religion policy. Although the diffusion literature in IR and comparative politics is 
comparatively underdeveloped relative to that in the American politics subfield, 
“diffusion/contagion processes fit logically in that set of questions which are traditionally 
asked by foreign policy or comparative politics analysts” (Most and Starr 1990, 392). 
  Scholars across subfields largely agree about the generic meaning of policy 
“diffusion,” despite slight differences in the way diffusion literature has developed across the 
different specialties.  At a basic level, Shipan and Volden (2012) define diffusion as “one 
government’s policy choices being influenced by the choices of other governments.” Karch 
(2007) clarifies, “Diffusion is about the movement of a policy across jurisdictional 
boundaries. In contrast, adoption is the decision to establish a policy in an individual 
jurisdiction.” Other scholars further emphasize “diffusion as a process, as opposed to an 
outcome. That is, diffusion is the interdependent process conducive to the spread of policies, 
not the extent of convergence that can result from it” (Gilardi 2012).  
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What have scholars learned about the process of policy diffusion thus far? Early 
studies of diffusion in the American politics subfield, particularly those that developed 
theoretical and methodological approaches allowing for internal and external policy 
determinants to be tested together, laid the groundwork for an extensive literature to emerge 
during the 1990s and 2000s (Walker 1969, Gray1973, Berry and Berry 1990). Several 
authors have previously provided detailed reviews of this literature and draw out key 
theoretical “lessons” about policy diffusion based on previous results (Shipan and Volden 
2012, Karch 2007, Gilardi 2012). These reviews each suggest that the literature has 
developed broadly under three questions succinctly articulated by Karch (2007): first, why 
does diffusion occur—that is, what driving forces (referred to as “mechanisms”) result in 
diffusion? Second, which political actors or forces (such as policy entrepreneurs or cross-
border organizations) facilitate diffusion? Finally, what specific policy content is being 
diffused?  
In an effort to address these questions, the diffusion literature has grown from basic 
studies simply attempting to gauge whether or not diffusion has occurred to increasingly 
sophisticated analyses developing detailed theoretical claims about different potential 
diffusion mechanisms and actors. For instance, recent work has pioneered new techniques for 
evaluating the role of interest groups or advocacy networks as political actors facilitating 
diffusion (Garrett and Jansa 2015, Donno 2010).  
In terms of policy content, diffusion theory is typically used to explain the spread of 
policy “innovations”—defined broadly as programs or policies that are new to the 
governments adopting them (Walker 1969). Scholars of American politics have typically 
focused their studies on the diffusion of specific types of statutes across state and local 
governments, such as the adoption of a state lottery (Berry and Berry 1990), or anti-smoking 
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legislation (Shipan and Volden 2008). In international relations and comparative politics, 
diffusion scholarship has more broadly attempted to explain the emergence of international 
norms of behavior such as the tendency of countries to invite international election observers 
(Hyde 2009) or agree to weapons bans (Carpenter 2011), revolutionary “waves” such as the 
Arab Spring (Weyland 2012), and the spread of democracy and economic liberalism (Bunce 
and Wolchik 2011; Huntington 1991; O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Simmons and Elkins 2004; 
Starr 1991; Wotipka and Ramirez 2008; Weyland 2010).  
As Maske and Volden (2011) note, however, there has been “limited attention to the 
attributes of policies” that may limit the generalizability of previous diffusion studies. “Given 
that many studies find policy diffusion while many others do not,” they assert, “the lack of an 
overarching emphasis on differences across these policies has limited the potential for 
cumulative building of knowledge across studies.” With a few exceptions (such as 
Horowitz’s (2010) examination of the spread of suicide bombing tactics across terrorist 
organizations), the IR and comparative literature has overwhelmingly focused on the 
diffusion of “innovations” in terms of policies or techniques that are typically associated with 
the normative ideals of protecting human rights, strengthening democratic institutions, or 
improving economic outcomes. As such, this study further contributes to the diffusion 
literature by considering the potential diffusion of policies clearly designed to restrict 
personal freedoms.  
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INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION MECHANISMS 
 
I attempt to assess whether or not restrictions on religious practice are spreading by 
evaluating different mechanisms that have been highlighted in previous literature. The 
following subsections develop hypotheses about the spread of restrictive government religion 
policy based on four potential diffusion mechanisms: geography, learning, imitation, and 
social construction. As outlined below, several scholars have attempted to build on early 
analyses based on geography by distinguishing between the ideas of learning, imitation, and 
social construction as separate or independent diffusion mechanisms. I argue, however, that 
imitation and social construction should just be considered as modified possible forms of 
learning. 
 
Geography  
Diffusion scholars across disciplines have long considered the potential role of 
regional affinity as a mechanism of policy diffusion (Karch 2007). For many, the very 
definition and measurement of diffusion is linked with idea of geographic proximity. One 
example of a typical definition, provided by Bunce and Wolchik (2011), suggests: “we 
understand diffusion to be a process whereby new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or 
repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to new sites, whether within a 
given state… or across states” (17). Early, prominent studies in both the American and 
IR/comparative literature largely focused on the diffusion of policies between neighboring 
units or within regional bounds (Berry and Berry 1990; Lutz 1987; Mooney and Lee 1995; 
Weyland 2005; Collier and Messick 1975).  
Karch (2007) notes that “most published research assumes that the existence of a 
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public policy in nearby states provides a model upon which state officials can draw.” He 
then outlines three of the most prominent theoretical explanations regularly offered to support 
the idea of geographic diffusion: first, the assumption that “geographic proximity… can 
facilitate the development of the communications networks among policymakers through 
which information about public policies spreads;” second, the idea that “overlapping media 
markets may alert citizens and government officials to the existence of political forms and 
policies in nearby states;” and third, the assumption that “public officials might be most 
inclined to use nearby states as policy models because they are likely to be culturally and 
demographically similar to their own states” (Karch 2007). 
While some recent papers have revisited the basic idea of spatial/geographic diffusion 
(Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Maske and Volden 2011), others have criticized the idea that 
geographic proximity, in and of itself, matters. For instance, Shipan and Volden (2012) argue 
that “while offering a good starting point, the classic view of policy diffusion as geographic 
clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly 
outdated.” Most critics emphasize that while regional clustering may have shaped diffusion 
in the past, “today’s low barriers to communication and travel” weaken the assumption that 
countries primarily obtain information about public policies from their neighbors (Shipan and 
Volden 2012, Karch 2007). Moreover, only limited empirical support exists to support the 
idea of a regional diffusion effect (Mooney 2001, Karch 2007). As such, scholars have 
largely begun to develop and test more specific potential mechanisms of diffusion—often 
based in part on assumptions previously associated with geography such as those highlighted 
above—on their own terms.  
Although I agree with the assertion that “the role of geographic proximity in the 
diffusion process is more complicated than most scholars have heretofore suggested,” I 
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believe there are still reasons to include and test for the idea of spatial diffusion. First, the 
prominence of geographic explanations in the literature suggests that simply ignoring the 
possibility without some form of empirical test would be insufficient. Second, although 
critics argue that the role of geography should be less prominent as communication and 
transportation networks has increased over time and many of the assumptions that justify 
studies of geographic diffusion have since been tested through more specific theoretical 
mechanisms, these arguments do not fully rule out the basic possibility that geography 
matters to some extent. Finally, it seems imprudent to assume that the impact of geographic 
proximity on diffusion would necessarily be the same 1) in both subnational and international 
studies, or 2) for all types of policy. As such, I briefly address both general and specific 
approaches to policy diffusion. Particularly because few studies evaluate the spread of 
restrictive or illiberal policies, I begin with a general, geography-focused hypothesis of 
spatial diffusion simply to assess the extent to which the diffusion of religious restrictions 
may actually occur across countries. Ways to parse out any potential impact of geography as 
opposed to other, more specific mechanisms are developed and discussed in the sections that 
follow.  
H1: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as the number of policies 
adopted by countries within the same geographic region rises.  
 
 
Learning 
 Policy diffusion scholars often consider “learning” as a diffusion mechanism. 
Although the basic idea—that policymakers learn from experience, examples, and new 
information and act accordingly—makes intuitive sense, precisely explaining and testing 
learning as a mechanism has proved particularly challenging (Maske and Volden 2011). 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) take an expansive view similar to the concept of 
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Bayesian updating, suggesting that “learning refers to a change in beliefs or change in 
one’s confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence, 
theories, or behavioral repertoires” (see also Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett (2007)). More 
fundamentally, Simmons and Elkins (2004) assert that learning occurs any time new 
information is acquired.  
While an important foundation, however, the idea that the availability of new 
information about a policy leads to learning may overly simplify a more complex causal 
process. As Simmons and Elkins (2004) acknowledge, information can be acquired in several 
different ways. Specifically, they identify policy success, communication (assuming 
information is more easily shared among governments that are in especially close 
communication), and cultural reference groups as possible diffusion mechanisms.  Although 
they classify all mechanisms as forms of learning, the majority of diffusion scholars have 
focused more on the apparent success of a policy as the relevant information considered by 
policymakers in the “learning” process (Gilardi 2012). This perspective is summarized by 
Shipan and Volden (2008), who argue, “In learning, policymakers focus on the policy 
itself—how was it adopted, was it effective, what were its political consequences?” 
Yet while policymakers may “intend to learn from the experiences of others, they are 
inherently limited by how the human brain processes new information” (Gilardi 2012). As 
such, effectively attempting to measure “learning” based on perceptions of a policy’s 
“success”—in effect, attempting to disassociate policy outcomes from the actor establishing 
policy—may be difficult and unrealistic in quantitative studies. Psychologists have argued 
that people rely on “simplifying heuristics” to evaluate information and that doing so may 
bias the ways they interpret and act upon that information (Kahneman 2011, 7). For example, 
cognitive shortcuts such as “availability” and “representativeness” suggest that policymakers 
 18 
do not consider all new information equally: “particularly vivid examples are more 
influential than less striking events,” and policymakers may “draw unwarranted inferences 
from a limited empirical basis” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Weyland 2005, 2007, 2009; 
Gilardi 2012). Ultimately, policymakers may or may not distinguish between policy success 
and political consequences and “discount information that is not in line with their 
preferences” (Gilardi 2010, 2012; Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008).  
Based on this work, I suggest that two other diffusion mechanisms discussed 
throughout the literature—imitation and social construction, sometimes both classified as 
forms of “emulation” and categorized separately from learning—may actually just be 
modified manifestations of learning. As such, I believe it may be difficult to make a hard 
distinction between learning and these two possible forms of emulation in consistently 
quantifiable ways. However, I do attempt to develop hypotheses that may assess the ability of 
these slightly different, albeit similar, mechanisms to predict policy adoption. With this in 
mind, my foundational learning hypothesis simply seeks to capture the idea that the 
availability of new information over time about a policy may influence policy adoption. I 
assume that because countries can observe and interact with one another, policy adoptions 
elsewhere increase the amount of information available to a country about the potential 
implications of a policy.  
H2: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as the number of restrictive 
policies adopted throughout the world rises. 
 
Imitation 
Although some studies do not distinguish between different types of emulation, others 
suggest that “imitation” is actor-centric whereas “social construction” is community-focused. 
For example, Shipan and Volden (2008) distinguish between learning and imitation by 
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arguing that “imitation involves a focus on the other government—what did that 
government do and how can we appear to be the same?” Simmons and Elkins (2004) also 
highlight how the perceived overall success of other countries (as opposed to just observable 
policy-specific success) may incentivize emulation: “The apparent success of others may in 
fact be a cognitive shortcut to assessing policy consequences; the relevant question in this 
process is, ‘What policies are the high achievers pursuing?’” Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 
(2007) similarly argue that diffusion motivated by imitation may be reflective of power 
asymmetry, but is founded more in a willing desire by both countries to reduce asymmetry. 
Exploring one way countries may work to reduce this type of asymmetry, Susan Hyde 
(2009) proposes that individual states can contribute to the formation and diffusion of 
international norms through “signaling.” Hyde’s signaling theory suggests that “democracy 
promoters” reward states they recognize as democratizing, in turn incentivizing governments 
with uncertain regime types to “signal” their commitment to democracy in an effort to obtain 
benefits. As all “true democrats” begin to adopt a common signal—in her study, inviting 
international election monitors—she expects even “pseudo-democrats” to mimic the behavior 
in an effort to mask their true type and probabilistically compete for the benefits associated 
with democracy.  
How might these theories extend to the adoption of restrictive religion policy? At a basic 
level, I suggest that imitation is a form of learning from countries that are perceived as 
politically or economically successful. Whereas Hyde focuses on the potential for regimes to 
signal their intent to potential benefactors by mimicking the behavior of “true democracies,” I 
would argue that the concept of “signaling” may equally apply in a different way: if “true” 
democracies or other powerful countries that shape opportunities for alliances and aid 
continue to adopt restrictive policies, they may implicitly “signal” to other regimes that such 
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policies are considered acceptable in practice. This approach may help to further explain 
why countries sometimes appear to adopt conflicting positions (such as inviting election 
monitors but ignoring their conclusions, or adopting a constitutional provision that protects 
religious freedom yet continuing to legislate or otherwise restrict religious practice). As such, 
I propose that the probability of policy adoption will increase as countries imitate relatively 
“successful” or “powerful” countries that have adopted similar policies. Potential ways to 
assess and measure this concept are discussed in more detail below. 
H3: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as “successful” or 
“powerful” countries adopt restrictive policies. 
 
Social Construction 
 In his seminal piece, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” Alexander Wendt explains 
that while both realism and liberalism disagree fundamentally about various aspects of 
international relations, both primarily draw upon the idea of a “self-interested state as the 
starting point for theory” (1992, 392). With this introduction, he argues that an examination 
of constructed identities and associated interests should precede the assumption of self-
interested state. Since this assertion, the school of constructivist thought in international 
relations has assumed that culture and meaning are socially constructed, suggesting that the 
merits or limitations of political action may be culturally encoded. For example, one of the 
causes proposed by Huntington (1991) in his theory regarding a “third wave of 
democratization” assumed that changes in church doctrine and practice spread throughout 
countries that shared a culturally similar, Catholic heritage; religious teachings were, in his 
view, communicated across countries through the cultural network and thus interpreted with 
special consideration, leading in part to the adoption of government policies to emphasize the 
importance of individual rights following Vatican II.  Some diffusion authors have 
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acknowledged the rise of these types of theories in constructivist IR literature and have 
since suggested that “social construction” can be a mechanism for policy diffusion.  
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007), for instance, suggest that the merits of a policy 
are socially constructed through epistemic communities and reference groups, increasing the 
probability of policy adoption following an adoption by a nation’s self-identified peers. 
Simmons and Elkins (2004) further explain this assumption, highlighting the potentially 
significant role of cultural reference groups in learning:  
Learning takes place at least partially through analogy, and lessons are viewed as 
more relevant to the extent to which a foreign case is viewed as analogous. …The 
policies of culturally similar countries are perceived to (and in fact may) contain 
highly relevant information on the appropriateness of a particular policy in a specific 
context of shared values. This perceived similarity may provide a cognitive shortcut 
for an individual… in a group decision-making context.  
Simmons and Elkins’ original hypothesis about cultural similarity and diffusion (which 
evaluated the influence of similarity on the spread of economic policy) has not been 
extensively tested in systematic ways by other scholars, even though it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that cultural similarity across countries may increase the likelihood of policy 
emulation. I believe this may be due in part to the difficulty of measuring the concept of 
“cultural similarity” in quantitative studies. Although definitively understanding which 
nations constitute a country’s self-identified peers may require in-depth qualitative or cultural 
studies, potential ways to measure the concept of cultural similarity are discussed in more 
detail below. Here, I attempt to test and extend Simmons and Elkins’ hypothesis by applying 
the general concept to the potential diffusion of restrictive religion policy.  
H4: The likelihood of adopting restrictive religion policies increases when culturally similar 
countries adopt such a policy. 
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EVALUATING DIFFUSION OF GOVERNMENT RELIGION POLICIES 
 
What Counts? Measuring Government Regulation of Religion 
To test these hypotheses, I adapt data from the Religion and State (RAS) Dataset 
compiled by Jonathan Fox and others as a part of the Religion and State Project at Bar-Ilan 
University (Akbaba and Fox 2011; Fox 2015, 2013, 2011b, 2009, 2006). This dataset 
includes several variables that record the presence or absence of over one hundred different 
kinds of religious regulations (and a basic measure of the level at which such legislation is 
enforced), several indices measuring the overall level of government involvement in religion, 
and the presence of a constitutional provision that codifies the separation of religion and state 
or the specific establishment of a state religion for each country in the dataset. This study 
specifically includes relevant and available observations from in the RAS dataset, which 
spans 175 countries with data for each year between 1990 and 2008.  
One potential limitation to the dataset is the tendency to emphasize government 
practice over the adoption of specific laws. That is, in some cases a country may be coded as 
adopting a restriction even if a law has not been passed so long as it is consistent government 
practice to enforce such a restriction. This practice is explained further in this excerpt from 
the RAS codebook:  
It is important to emphasize that these codings focus on the relationship between 
religion and the state apparatus. For a variable to be coded, there must either be a law 
or a consistent government practice. In cases where the two contradict, consistent 
government practice was coded. These codings also represent the practice of the 
federal or national governments of states, and not practices by local governments. 
However, if a large number of local or regional governments engage in a practice it is 
also coded (Fox 2009).  
 
Despite this potential uncertainty in the coded data, however, I believe the data can 
still be used to evaluate the general trend of concern—that is, whether or not restrictions on 
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religious practice are indeed diffusing across countries and if so, in what ways? As such, I 
treat the data as representative of a policy adoption without attempting to distinguish whether 
or not the new governmental norm is codified in law or simply manifest in consistent 
government practice. 
I largely accept this assumption recognizing that government religion policy can be 
difficult to quantify.1 What, for instance, should be considered restrictive government 
religion policy? Fox (2013) notes that while terms such as “‘religious discrimination’ and 
‘religious freedom’ seem at first glance straightforward, they are not. Each has multiple 
possible meanings and interpretations” (13). To operationalize these concepts, Sarkissian 
suggests that “religious regulation can be defined broadly to include all laws and rules that 
are enacted to govern religious affairs in a state, those that both support and oppose religion” 
(2015, 27). Here, I agree with Sarkissian and others that regulations that are “intended to 
repress religion and therefore… policies that restrict it” can include both overtly 
discriminatory policies as well as policies that support or favor some forms of religious 
expression (Sarkissian 2015, 27; Fox 2015).  
Acknowledging the complex normative and scholarly debate surrounding what types 
of policies constitute religious “restrictions,” I focused only on policy types that could fairly 
clearly be categorized as restrictive based on the following assumptions, rather than including 
all of the policies tracked in the RAS dataset.2 First, I consider discriminatory policies to be 
those that clearly violate the principles articulated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a more detailed discussion of the challenges associated with data collection and measurement when 
studying religion and state, see Fox 2011b.  
 
2 In future work, expanding the sample to include more policies from the RAS dataset may improve 
statistical analysis by increasing the number of observations. For this project, however, time constraints and  
2 In future work, expanding the sample to include more policies from the RAS dataset may improve 
statistical analysis by increasing the number of observations. For this project, however, time constraints and 
theoretical concerns—namely an effort to focus on restrictive policies rather than all forms of government 
religion policy—suggested that the selection of a sample might be appropriate. 
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cited in the introduction (that is, the right of an individual to “change his religion or belief” 
and to “manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance”). 
Second, I recognize that government support for certain religious groups or actions in the 
form of funding or other resources can also “constitute religious repression,” as it “often 
results in discrimination or restrictions against those who do not benefit from government 
support” and “may also be intended to restrict the [favored] group itself” (Sarkissian 2015, 
27).   
With this in mind, I selected a sample of twenty specific types of policy from the 
RAS dataset that may be considered representative of a government’s overall level of 
restrictive religion policy. The original RAS dataset separately categorizes policies based on 
whether or not they target minority, majority, or all religions, as well as whether or not they 
are overtly restrictive or more implicitly regulatory. Although it may be interesting in future 
research to determine if restrictive policies categorized by targeted group may diffuse in 
different ways, this paper is designed to assess the spread of restrictions generally. As such, 
an effort was made to reduce selection bias by including roughly the same number of policies 
for comparison from each of the original RAS categories. In short, because the literature has 
not yet examined the potential international diffusion of restrictive religion policy in a 
general sense, my sample includes policies that may be categorized by their substantive goals 
regardless of whether or not they target minorities exclusively or all religions generally. The 
twenty policies I selected may be grouped into the following substantive categories, with 
specific examples provided in Table 1:  
1. Restrictions on formal religious organizations (including religiously-
affiliated or inspired political parties or unions);  
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2. Restrictions on religious speech and/or the dissemination of religious 
materials; 
3. Restrictions on public observances of religion, including holidays and any 
observation of the Sabbath or its equivalent; 
4. Restrictions on religious proselytizing; and  
5. Legislation that supports some forms of religious expression but may, as 
described above, be used by the government in restrictive ways (i.e. the 
presence of religious education in publicly-funded schools or the provision 
of government funding for building, repairing, or maintaining religious 
sites).  
For each policy, the original RAS dataset simply provides information from year to 
year about whether or not a policy is in place and the extent to which it is enforced. To assess 
policy diffusion, however, the dependent variable of interest should capture whether or not a 
nation adopts new policies over time. Available data on these policies are thus recoded 
dichotomously to reflect years of policy adoption and combined across categories to ensure 
that there are sufficient observations (at a country-year level of analysis) with which to test 
the hypotheses. 
This approach—of evaluating policy diffusion with categories of different types of 
legislation instead of focusing on one specific policy—has also been applied in other 
prominent studies of policy diffusion. This article employs the same logic as Shipan and 
Volden (2008), who examine policy diffusion across cities throughout the United States by 
evaluating anti-smoking policy adoption with three different categories of anti-smoking laws. 
As they highlight, examining multiple policy choices in the same years for the same countries 
allows a policy adoption to be considered a type of repeated event, as a policy in any of the 
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categories could be adopted at any time in any order (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002; 
Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld 1989; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008).  
In short, I first summarize the number of policies (of the twenty policies included in 
the study) adopted by each country in each year. While many countries had years without any 
policy adoptions, the maximum number of policies adopted in a given year by one country 
was seven. Figure 1 highlights the number of policies adopted in each year of the study, and 
Figure 2 notes that by the end of 2008, worldwide policy adoption (in the categories sampled) 
totaled an additional 203 policies.  
I then use this information to create a consolidated dependent variable that is initially 
set equal to 0 and is then set equal to 1 in the years in which a country adopts additional 
restrictions, resulting in 140 observations of adoption at a country-year level. Due to the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I employ logistic regression for the purpose of 
conducting standard binary event history analysis (as a commonly utilized tool throughout 
diffusion literature) (Berry and Berry 1990; Wotipka and Ramirez 2008; Graham, Shipan and 
Volden 2013). 
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Assessing Diffusion Mechanisms 
My general spatial diffusion hypothesis suggests that a country will be more likely to 
adopt a restriction if its geographic neighbors have already done so. To test this hypothesis, I 
construct the variable Geography, which captures the total number of policies adopted by 
countries in the same geographic region between 1990 and the prior year (i.e. for 1996, it 
represents the total number of policies adopted in the region between 1990 and 1995). 
Geographic region is coded based on a country’s regional designation by the UN Statistics 
Division (United Nations n.d.). Due to its broad nature, this variable may in turn capture 
some of the effect of more specific mechanisms, but may be helpful in that sense as I can 
then compare the goodness of fit of a model based on this variable as opposed to models 
based on the more specific mechanisms. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient, 
assuming that the probability of adoption will increase as the number of restrictive policies 
adopted by neighboring states increases.  
 Considering learning as a relatively broad category in and of itself, I attempt to first 
evaluate the learning hypothesis with Learning, a variable that counts the total number of 
restrictions adopted across the world between 1990 and the beginning of the year in question. 
Although this measure could again potentially capture some aspects of imitation or social 
construction, it fundamentally assumes that the higher the number of policies adopted across 
the world, the more information there is available to a country interested in adopting such a 
restriction, improving their understanding of potential consequences of the policy. Thus, I 
expect Learning to have a positive coefficient: as the number of restrictive policies adopted 
throughout the world increases, so to should the likelihood of future adoption.  
 Distinguishing between and measuring imitation and social construction is more 
difficult. To do so, however, I return to an understanding of imitation as actor-centric and 
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social construction as community-centric. As discussed above, I assume that imitation 
would primarily be driven by attempts to emulate larger or more powerful countries that have 
adopted similar restrictions. Different ways of operationalizing the concept of “powerful” or 
“successful” countries, however, may have different theoretical implications. Joseph Nye 
(2004, 1-2) argues,  
Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few 
understand it….Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define and 
measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells us that power is the capacity to 
do things. …The dictionary also tells us that power means having the capabilities to 
affect the behavior of others to make those things happen. So more specifically, 
power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. 
…But things are not as straightforward as they first appear. …Power always depends 
on the context in which the relationship exists. 
What is the relevant context of the relationships in this study? I find it unlikely that 
“powerful” countries would deliberately exert some form of influence to convince a country 
to adopt restrictive religion policies that limit personal freedoms. As such, I return to a 
modified signaling theory as articulated above: whether intentionally or not, I argue that 
when “powerful” countries that could influence others adopt restrictions, they signal to other 
countries that those policies will not be challenged on the world stage.  
To measure this potential phenomenon, I construct variables that assess the total 
number of policies previously adopted by “powerful” countries. I suggest two possible 
proxies that may capture which nations would be considered powerful or influential in this 
sense: first, the extent to which a country controls a significant share of military and 
economic resources available throughout the world, and second, whether or not a country is a 
member of the OECD. While there is some overlap in the countries that will be considered 
“powerful” between these two categories, they represent theoretically different perspectives. 
The first measure—approximated here using the Composite Index of National Capability 
developed for version five of the National Material Capabilities dataset in the Correlates of 
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War project—more closely aligns with conventional definitions of “hard power” (Singer 
1987). This variable totals the number of restrictive policies previously adopted by the thirty-
five countries with the highest share of power in the CINC database prior to the year in 
question.  
In contrast, OECD member countries are more likely associated with “soft power”—
leadership based on culture, values, etc.—as implied in the organization’s mission statement:  
“to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around 
the world” by a “shared commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions 
and focused on the well-being of citizens” (“About the OECD”). This variable totals the 
number of restrictive policies previously adopted by OECD member countries prior to the 
year in question. Given this emphasis on democratic institutions and freedoms, it would be 
particularly interesting from a normative perspective if countries imitate OECD members in 
adopting restrictive religion policies. In short, I propose two different variables that could 
separately assess imitation as a diffusion mechanism. For each, I expect a positive 
coefficient, assuming that a desire or willingness to emulate “powerful” countries will 
increase the probability of adoption.  
With respect to social construction, I primarily seek to test and extend the Simmons 
and Elkins (2004) cultural similarity hypothesis as it applies to the adoption of restrictive 
government religion policy. Simmons and Elkins measured cultural similarity in three ways: 
1) whether or not a country shared the same dominant language, 2) whether or not the 
country had a common colonial heritage, or 3) whether or not a country shared the same 
dominant religion. Interestingly, they found the strongest support for diffusion among 
countries with similar religious cultures, with less conclusive results for the influence of 
former colonial background or dominant language.  
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Returning to Maske and Volden’s (2011) assertion that diffusion mechanisms may 
vary across policies with different attributes, however, I suggest that re-testing Simmons and 
Elkins’ (2004) findings with different policy types is important for developing a better 
understanding of the potential impact of social construction in policy diffusion. As such, I 
measure cultural similarity in two ways similar to Simmons and Elkins. First, I use “politico-
geographic” region codings from the V-Dem dataset as a proxy to group countries that have 
common colonial history, institutions or language (Coppedge et al. 2016).3 Specifically, 
politico-geographic region was defined in the codebook as regions based on “geographic 
proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by 
scholars in studies of democratization” (i.e. grouping post-Communist countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia together or grouping Australia and New Zealand in a single 
category with Western Europe and North America). This variable, in particular, also builds 
upon and refines more basic ideas of geographic diffusion. I anticipate that this variable will 
have a positive effect. Figure 3 highlights the percentage of total policies adopted during the 
time period by each politico-geographic region. 
Second, I develop a measure to assess the relationship between countries with the 
same dominant religion. This variable is constructed to count the number of previous 
adopters with the same religious majority as the country (i.e. the number of predominantly 
Sunni Muslim countries that have adopted a restriction prior to another predominantly Sunni 
Muslim country).4  My codings are based on religious demographic statistics found in version 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While taken from the V-Dem database for this project, this variable was originally developed in the 
Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017).  
4Because the demographic data on religious affiliations only exists in five year increments, annual codings 
were inferred based on whatever the dominant religious group was at the previous measurement (i.e. if a 
country was predominantly Catholic in 1990 but had a higher demographic share of “Other Christian” in 
the 1995 data, it was coded as Catholic for years 1990-1994 and “Other Christian” from 1995-1999).  
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1.1 of the World Religions dataset through the Correlates of War project; I identify a 
country as one of 12 categories (Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Other Christian, Jewish, Sunni 
Islam, Shia Islam, Other Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Other (i.e. Confucian, Animist), Non-
Religious, and No Clear Majority) based on the religious group with the highest share of the 
population (Maoz and Henderson 2013). I believe this measure in particular should have a 
relatively strong, positive influence in this case: it may be even more reasonable to assume 
that nations with similar religious cultures feel similarly about the relationship of religion and 
state (relative to Simmons and Elkins’ (2004) assumptions and findings that similar religious 
cultures may influence the adoption of economic policy).5 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Historians have long noted that dominant religious culture can strongly influence the relationship between 
religion and state. For an example of this literature, see Kalkandjieva 2011. 
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Controlling for Domestic Influences 
To better assess the potential impact of diffusion mechanisms, I include several 
controls for domestic factors that may influence government religion policy. First, I construct 
a variable to control for the extent to which a country is democratic. In an effort to reduce the 
likelihood of endogeneity, I create an index variable based on several indicators in the V-
Dem dataset that exclude measures otherwise often included in proxies for democracy (such 
as protections of civil liberties that may include measures of religious freedom or more 
general protections for freedom of expression and association) (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
Specifically, I equally weigh measures gauging the share of the adult population with 
suffrage, the extent to which elections are held and can be considered "free and fair," whether 
or not the chief executive is elected, and the extent to which the judiciary or legislature are 
able to act independently and exercise checks and balances over executive power.6 I 
anticipate that this variable will have a negative effect (as the level of democracy increases, 
the likelihood of adopting a restriction falls). 
As previous literature has not conclusively identified the impact of a constitutional 
separation of religion and state (SRAS) clause on government religion policy, I separately 
include a control variable from the Religion and State dataset which is set equal to 1 if such a 
clause is present. However, I assume that this measure is more likely to influence the general 
type of government religion policy in a country as opposed to the extent to which a country is 
susceptible to the diffusion of policy, and thus anticipate that any (potentially negative) effect 
will likely be mild and not significant. 
Next, I include a control—Regime Duration—to account for the number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For more detailed information on these individual indicators, consult the V-Dem v. 6 Codebook for the 
variables v2x_suffr, v2xel_frefair, v2x_accex, v2x_jucon, and v2xlg_legcon (Coppedge et al. 2016). 
 35 
consecutive years of the current regime type in a country (Coppedge et al. 2016).7  Again, I 
expect this variable to have a negative coefficient (that is, the longer a regime type remains 
stable, the less likely a country will be to adopt additional restrictions). To control for 
economic factors, I include the growth rate of GDP per capita using data from the World 
Bank (2017). Finally, to account for possible time trends, I include a cubic polynomial 
approximation of the number of years prior to failure or the end of the observation period 
(Carter and Signorino 2010).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 While taken from the V-Dem database for this project, this variable was originally developed in Boix, 
Miller, and Rosato (2013) and captures changes in government type (i.e. non-democracy to democracy) 
rather than shifts between individual leaders in a government. 
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RESULTS 
 
 Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics for the variables included in analysis. 
Although many diffusion scholars turn to basic logistic regression for event history analysis, 
however, it is possible that standard logit results may be biased in this case. As reflected in 
the mean value of the dependent variable in Table 2 (0.042, suggesting that the outcome of 
interest was only observed approximately 4.2 percent of the time), this dataset may be 
classified as capturing rare events: out of 3325 country-year observations, only 140 failures 
were observed. King and Zeng (2001) note that when working with rare event data, a logit 
model often compresses the estimated probabilities, potentially obscuring substantive effects. 
They then propose a number of remedies for addressing such bias as well as re-
conceptualizing the substantive effect observed in original logit coefficients. As such, the 
regression results included in the body of this paper were generated using King and Zeng’s 
(1999, 2001) corrections for modeling rare events (Tomz, King and Zeng 1999). For 
comparison, the output of standard logit models as well as graphs visualizing the changes in 
predicted probabilities based on the uncorrected logit are included in the appendix.  
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How are these variables related? Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between 
different variables. Notably, the correlation matrix provides some support for my theoretical 
assumption that imitation and social construction may just be modified forms of learning: in 
particular, both ways I measure imitation are highly correlated with learning (at 0.988 and 
0.986 respectively); the social construction variables are also moderately correlated (at 0.578 
and 0.632 respectively). Similarly, the spatial diffusion variable (geography) and first proxy 
for cultural similarity (politico-geographic region) are also highly correlated (0.716). Based 
on both the theory and these correlation results, I do not include more than one of these 
related mechanisms at a time in a logit model. None of the mechanism variables appear 
closely correlated with the dependent variable or controls.  
Table 4 presents the corrected logit coefficients and standard errors of rare events 
models (Models 1-6) that separately assess each diffusion mechanism.  Taken individually, 
each mechanism is statistically significant to some degree, and as expected, all had a positive 
effect on the odds of policy adoption. 
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 King and Zeng (2001) suggest that one of the best ways to interpret the substantive 
significance of regression results in rare events models is to compare the percentage change 
in relative risk between different values of a variable. 8 They argue that at a baseline, even a 
ten to twenty percent increase in relative risk may be considered substantively important in 
rare event studies. Based on this assumption, these results suggest a meaningful substantive 
impact in addition to the statistical significance noted in Table 4. The strongest effect was 
associated with imitation based on representations of power in the CINC database; holding 
other factors constant, the change in relative risk between the 25th and 75th percentile was 
74.1 percent. Measures of general learning and the imitation of OECD countries had the next 
highest impact, with a 57.9 percent change in the likelihood of adoption as more countries 
around the world adopted restrictive policies and a 47 percent change as the number of 
policies adopted by OECD members increased. As countries within the same geographic 
region adopted restrictive policies (assuming some form of spatial diffusion), the increase in 
relative risk was 30.1 percent. Finally, both measures of social construction presented the 
smallest (albeit still notable) differences in relative risk: The adoption of policies within the 
same politico-geographic region was associated with an increase the predicted probability of 
adoption of 21.1 percent; as countries with the same religious majority adopted restricted 
policies, the change in relative risk was 15.8 percent.   
Coefficients for the control variables largely supported the theoretical assumptions 
outlined above. Notably, the control measure for democracy was the strongest and only 
statistically significant control with a negative coefficient in all models as predicted; holding 
other factors constant, democracy was consistently associated with a decrease of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For each mechanism, I calculated the percent change in relative risk (that is, in the probability of 
adoption) between values at the 25th percentile and 75th percentile using the formula recommended by 
King and Zeng (2001): 100 * [rr – 1], where rr is the relative risk calculated in STATA 12 following a rare 
events regression.   
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approximately 80 percent in the odds of adoption. Regime duration and economic growth 
similarly held negative coefficients although statistically insignificant. As anticipated, a 
separation of religion and state clause was not a significant predictor, but maintained a 
positive coefficient across all six models.  All in all, the calculated p values associated with 
Wald χ2 statistics for all six models suggest that for each model, a null hypothesis assuming 
no effect of the variables included should be rejected in favor of these models that account to 
some extent for policy diffusion across countries. In short, these results provide moderate 
support for the assumption that restrictive government religion policy is diffusing across 
countries in some way. 
How should these potential diffusion mechanisms be compared? While previous 
diffusion literature often combines all proposed mechanisms in a final model to isolate odds 
ratios or statistical significance when taken together, I argue that this may not be the best 
approach. For instance, as noted above, mechanisms that may differ theoretically in 
important ways but are highly or moderately correlated (such as general measures of learning 
compared to modified forms of learning such as imitation of specific actors) could fail to 
achieve significance when assessed together in the same model.  
The results presented in Table 5—where Models 7-10 attempt to compare learning, 
imitation, or social construction mechanisms to geography—provide further support for this 
assumption: even when less closely-related theoretical concepts (yet still moderately 
correlated variables) are tested together, almost all significance for diffusion mechanisms is 
eliminated while a control for democracy remains strongly predictive. These apparently 
“negligible” results, however, may still have substantive significance if considered outside 
the boundaries of conventional statistical significance (Rainey 2014). For instance, similar 
comparative models developed as a purely theoretical check (which include only 
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international diffusion variables without domestic controls—see Table 6) continue to 
provide statistical support for various mechanisms (Achen 2002, 2005).  
  
 43 
  
 44 
 
 
  
 45 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Taken together, these results provide some support for the idea that global restrictions 
on religious freedom are not only increasing, but that the increase in policy adoption may be 
partially explained by international diffusion of ideas rather than exclusively occurring as a 
result of domestic factors. This extends the current body of literature on the relationship 
between religion and state and on the origins of government religion policy, which has so far 
focused almost entirely on internal determinants of policy. These findings also extend the 
diffusion literature by suggesting that mechanisms commonly proposed as independent—
such as learning, imitation, and social construction—may be more closely interrelated than 
they are perhaps always treated. Yet the finding that many diffusion mechanisms identified 
by other scholars as largely separate can be highly interrelated complicates previous research.  
In short, the theoretical discussion advanced in the paper merits additional 
examination in future work. Are differences in findings across the literature primarily driven 
by differences in the operationalization and measurement of concepts? Is it really possible to 
accurately disentangle social construction, learning, and imitation? Or should these 
mechanisms be reframed to examine an interaction of factors? Can qualitative studies or case 
studies shed further light on these findings and help to better distinguish the roles of these 
mechanisms in international policy diffusion? Could scholars actually learn more about 
diffusion by interacting domestic and international factors (i.e. the level of democracy 
interacted with measures of imitation based on hard power)? 
 Finally, what can be learned about diffusion by looking beyond simple policy 
adoption? In particular, I believe that examining the extent to which a policy is enforced or 
its duration in practice may further illuminate the strength and longevity of policy diffusion, 
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similar to Shipan and Volden’s (2008) conditional and temporal effects hypotheses. All in 
all, understanding the diffusion of restrictions of religious freedom may complicate the 
growing literature that has traced the diffusion of political and economic liberalism over the 
past several decades. 
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The following tables and figures present the uncorrected (standard) logistic 
regression results corresponding to those reported in the paper above. Table 7 compares with 
Table 4; Figures 4 through 9 plot the change in predicted probabilities associated with the 
logistic models estimated in Table 7. Tables 8 and 9 correspond with Tables 5 and 6 in the 
main text, respectively. 
The uncorrected results may be summarized as follows: Some of the strongest effects 
were associated with the imitation of OECD countries and spatial diffusion: holding other 
factors constant, the odds of adoption increased by 10.8 percent and the predicted probability 
of adoption increased from .036 to .078 when OECD countries had previously adopted 
restrictive policies. Similarly, the predicted probability of adoption increased from .037 to 
.093 as countries within the same geographic region adopted restrictive policies and the odds 
of adoption increased, on average, by 3.5 percent. Next, the impact of imitation based on 
representations of power in the CINC database was an increase in the predicted probability of 
adoption from .028 to .076; here, however, the percentage change in the odds of adoption 
was 2.8 percent. Both proxies of social construction produced similar results: the adoption of 
policies within the same politico-geographic region was associated with an increase the 
predicted probability of adoption from .037 to .071 and a 1.2 percent change in the odds. As 
countries with the same religious majority adopted restricted policies, the odds of adoption 
increased by 1.1 percent and the predicted probability of adoption rose from .04 to .086. 
Finally, as countries learn from the adoption of policies worldwide, the predicted probability 
of adoption increased from .030 to .074 and odds of adoption only increase by roughly .5 
percent.   
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